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ABSTRACT
Empirical studies have demonstrated that compared to almost all other parties, 
populist radical right (PRR) parties draw more votes from men than from women. 
However, the two dominant explanations that are generally advanced to explain 
this disparity – gender differences regarding socio-economic position and 
lower perceptions regarding the threat of immigrants – cannot fully explain 
the difference. The article contends that it might actually be gender differences 
regarding the conceptualisation of society and politics – populist attitudes – 
that explain the gender gap. Thus, the gap may be due, in part, to differences in 
socialisation. The article analyses EES 2014 data on voting for the populist radical 
right and the populist radical left in nine European countries. Across countries, the 
gender gap in voting for the PRR is indeed partly explained by populist attitudes. 
For populist radical left parties, the results are less clear, suggesting that populism 
has different meanings to voters on the left and on the right.
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The electoral success of populist parties does not seem to subside. In fact, it 
appears that the opposite is true: in addition to the continuing success of pop-
ulist radical right parties (PRR), in recent years, there has also been a surge 
in populist (radical) left parties. Recent examples include Podemos in Spain, 
SYRIZA in Greece, Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy,1 the Dutch Socialistische Partij, 
and Die Linke in Germany. The continued, and perhaps even growing, success 
of populist parties presents us with an interesting question: why do voters 
continue to support populist parties?
CONTACT niels spierings   n.spierings@maw.ru.nl
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Research in the last 10 to 15 years has provided answers to this question. 
Reasons for the support for the populist radical right are found in opposition to 
immigration (e.g. Immerzeel 2015; Lubbers et al. 2002; Norris 2005; Spierings 
and Zaslove 2015b), lower levels of trust in political institutions (Norris 
2005) and being less well educated, younger, and male (Harteveld et al. 2015; 
Immerzeel 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015b). In contrast, supporters of the 
populist radical left are marginally more supportive of economic equality than 
supporters of other parties (Visser et al. 2014). The socio-economic profile of 
(populist) radical left parties is, however, less clear. Visser et al. (2014) show 
that those with lower incomes and those who are unemployed are more likely 
to possess a radical left ideology. Ramiro (2016) finds that those who identify 
with the working class are more likely to support radical left parties. Education 
is, however, more complicated: both less well and more highly educated voters 
are attracted to the radical left (Ramiro 2016). Nevertheless, there is a quality 
that the populist radical right and populist left parties have in common: their 
populist attitudes (Akkerman and Zaslove 2014; Akkerman et al. 2014).
Despite our growing knowledge of why voters support the PRR, a recurring 
puzzle is the gendered nature of their support. In other words, the question 
is: why do PRR parties receive more male than female support? In seeking an 
answer to this question, we start with the abundant literature on the so-called 
PRR gender gap (see Spierings and Zaslove 2015b; Spierings et al. 2015). This 
literature suggests two main explanations for the gender gap: first, the difference 
is due to socio-economic position, and second, it is due to programmatic atti-
tudes, most notably anti-immigration and law and order attitudes (Harteveld 
et al. 2015; Immerzeel et al. 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015b). However, 
most notably, neither of these explanations helps us fully understand why more 
men than women vote for populist (radical right) parties. The socio-economic 
explanation argues that women are more likely to be employed in the public 
sector and less likely to be employed in labour-intensive jobs and are therefore 
less likely to be threatened by deindustrialisation. These factors, in turn, make 
women less likely to be attracted to PRR parties (see Harteveld et al. 2015; 
Immerzeel et al. 2015; see also Ivarsflaten 2005, 2008; Spierings and Zaslove 
2015b). However, these factors only partly explain the gap. A second possible 
explanation is that women feel less threatened by immigration – they are not 
in direct competition with migrants – and thus they may hold weaker anti-im-
migrant attitudes (Immerzeel et al. 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015b). Even 
if it were true that less competition exists between migrants and women, this 
does not translate into lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes among women. 
It has been shown repeatedly that there is scarcely any difference between men 
and women regarding anti-immigration attitudes (Harteveld et al. 2015; Norris 
2005; Spierings and Zaslove 2015b). In sum, these approaches cannot fully 
account for the gender gap.
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Therefore, in this study, we investigate a new, third explanation: whether the 
populist nature of the parties in question explains why more men than women 
support PRR parties. In order to investigate this line of research, it is necessary 
to focus not only on the PRR but also on the populist left. This approach is 
in line with the party literature that considers populism to be a thin-centred 
ideology (Mudde 2007). Thin-centred ideologies are not full ideologies and 
must attach themselves to other ideologies ‒ for example, to the anti-immi-
gration ideology of the radical right. It is our contention that the thin-centred 
ideology of populism appeals to voters with certain political attitudes, which 
are on average more prevalent among men than women due (ceteris paribus) 
to political socialisation processes. As noted, given that we focus on a broad 
definition of populism, it is important that we not only focus on the populist 
radical right but also on the populist radical left (PRL). As a result, if our 
explanation holds, it might also shed light on the recent increase in voting for 
populist radical left parties.
The article is organised as follows. We begin by briefly discussing the con-
cept of populism, relating it to voter attitudes. We link this discussion to the 
gendered processes of socialisation, which leads to our contention regarding 
the gender gap in voting for populist parties. Next, we examine the extent to 
which the gender gap exists among populist radical right voters and focus on 
whether the gap found is partly due to a gender difference regarding populist 
attitudes. Because this analysis demonstrates that populism can indeed partly 
explain the gender gap, we then move to the populist radical left to further 
test whether a populist ideology and populist attitudes are gendered in the 
same way on the left as on the right. The analyses are based on the latest voter 
data from the European Election Survey 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2015) for nine 
European countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.
Theoretical background
It is common to claim that there is a gender gap with regard to voting for 
populist radical right parties, and there is certainly ample evidence that this 
is the case. Since the early rise of populist radical right parties, research has 
identified a gender gap.2 Betz (1994: 143) notes that in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s, only 43% of the supporters of the French National Front and 40% 
of the supporters of the Austrian Freedom Party were women. Kitschelt and 
McGann (1997: 76) confirm these findings, noting that ‘men are overrepre-
sented in the rightist electorate with a 60–40 to 70–30 margin’. They go on to 
say, ‘This pattern underlines the importance of the authoritarian antifeminist 
thrust in the contemporary extreme right’ (Kitschelt and McGann 1997: 76). 
Norris (2005: 145) again confirms these findings. She notes that men outnum-
bered women in Austria and Denmark by a ratio (compared to the national 
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average) of 1.3 to 0.7 and in France by 1.3 to 0.8 in their support for the radical 
right. At the same time, however, there is also evidence that the gender gap is 
perhaps not as large as is often claimed. Spierings and Zaslove (2015b) note that 
we should be careful not to overstate the degree to which the populist radical 
right is gendered, especially in comparison to centre-right parties. Nevertheless, 
the authors conclude that there is no doubt that more men than women vote 
for populist radical right parties. As discussed above, significant attention has 
been paid to explaining this gender gap, and socio-economic explanations have 
proven fruitful, but the question of why women have lower likelihoods of voting 
for PRR parties than men remains partly unanswered.
In this section, we have two aims. First, we briefly address the concept of 
populism from a party ideology perspective as well as from an individual-level 
voter perspective. Second, we theorise how populist attitudes at the individual 
level might be gendered, which might help to explain the gender gap in populist 
voting. In doing so, we show that this approach offers a new, additional explana-
tion to our understanding of the gender gap while at the same time offering an 
additional explanation for how structural factors and socio-economic position 
might be linked to it ‒ i.e. populist attitudes may function as a mediator.
Populism, a thin-centred ideology – parties and attitudes
The literature on populism makes an important distinction regarding the nature 
of populism: it argues that populism is a thin-centred ideology (Mudde 2004; 
see also Akkerman et al. 2014). The thin-centred nature of populism implies 
that it is necessary to distinguish between populism and what is referred to as 
the attaching ideology. Populism is a thin-centred ideology because it is not 
able to stand on its own. The argument goes as follows: a full ideology is an 
ideology that has a position (policy position or programme) that covers the full 
range of policy domains (Akkerman et al. 2014; Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008). 
Thin-centred ideologies do not have these qualities: they are ideologies inso-
far as it is possible to identify the core characteristics of populism (a minimal 
definition); however, they must rely on other ideologies for the full content of 
their ideology, which accounts for the left- and the right-wing nature of populist 
parties (Akkerman et al. 2014; Mudde 2004, 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013).
This analysis begs the question: what is populism? The thin-centred ideo-
logical approach points to several core characteristics (Akkerman et al. 2014; 
Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). First, populism is people-centred. 
Populists argue that the people are the basis of the democratic decision-making 
process: democratic representation begins with the people. Second, there is an 
emphasis on the people versus the elites. It is not enough for populists to be 
simply people-centred; they must also juxtapose the people with the elites, who 
are usually identified as the corrupt elites. Third, this distinction must be viewed 
as antagonistic, or Manichean, such that the good people are juxtaposed with 
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the bad (corrupt) elites. The fourth element is the notion of the general will. 
Populist notions of representation focus on the idea that the party or movement 
in question represents the general will of the people (Akkerman et al. 2014; 
Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013; Rooduijn 2013; Zaslove 2008).
This notion of populism is what unifies populist radical left and populist 
radical right parties both on the supply and demand sides (Akkerman et al. 
2014; Akkerman and Zaslove 2014; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Populist 
parties of both the left and the right focus on the distinction between the elite 
and the people. It is certainly quite possible that their conception of the people 
may be different: radical left populists may be less exclusionary – in part due 
to a focus on economic issues and not culture – than the populist radical right 
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013).
The populist nature of populist parties is often identified with the supply 
side ‒ i.e. with the programmes of the parties and the discourses of the leaders 
(see Hawkins 2009; Rooduijn 2013). However, recent research has also iden-
tified populist attitudes among voters (Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 
2012; Spruyt et al. 2016). The distinction between elites and the people and the 
notion that sovereignty should lie not with the elites but with the people are 
also found among the supporters of populist parties. These studies have found 
that populist voters can be distinguished from non-populist voters ‒ i.e. those 
who have more pluralist attitudes (favouring compromise and listening to other 
opinions) ‒ and from voters who have more elitist attitudes ‒ i.e. arguing that 
politicians should lead and not follow the people, or that successful individuals 
from business or independent experts should govern (Akkerman et al. 2014; 
Hawkins et al. 2012).
Gendered political socialisation
Given that populism is a thin-centred ideology, it is possible that the gendered 
nature of support for populist radical right and populist radical left parties may 
be due to populism and that it may have less to do with the attaching ideology ‒ 
i.e. the radical right or the radical left nature of the parties in question. In other 
words, it may be the populist attitudes of the supporters that lie at the heart of 
why women do or do not support populist parties. In exploring this argument, 
we first discuss how these attitudes might be gendered, and we then move on 
to how these gendered attitudes might explain the gender gap in voting for 
PRR and PRL parties.
We start by recalling the insight that women and men tend to be socialised 
differently (Sapiro 1983; Trevor 1999). Parents and society reward different 
behaviours by girls and boys, and different examples are set about ‘correct 
behaviour’. These differences in socialisation evidently include political behav-
iour; part of this process can for instance be found in the way media depict 
female and male politicians differently (e.g. Gidengil and Everitt 2003; Ross and 
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Sreberny 2000). The differences in socialisation include elements that relate to 
populism as an attitude. For instance, women are depicted as less aggressive, 
more consensus-seeking, and friendlier (e.g. Ross and Sreberny 2000; Sawer 
2002; Van Zoonen 2001), and these differences are not without consequences, 
as prior studies suggest that gender differences in average political attitudes 
explain certain political behaviours.
For instance, Golebiowska (1999) shows that women are more politically 
tolerant than men. Verba et al. (1997) attempt to explain why men are more 
engaged in politics than women and note that considerations that are normally 
associated with political engagement (such as education or income) do not 
explain the gender gap. Rather, the authors claim that, on average, it appears 
that men and woman may have different ‘tastes for politics’. Fish (2002) makes 
the differences even more tangible, arguing that men are more prone to con-
flictual politics and women prefer consensus-seeking.
Populist attitudes and the gender gap
Mudde (2007) makes a similar argument regarding populist radical right par-
ties, taking a first step in translating this general theorisation to the question 
at hand here. He refers to the argument as the ‘low efficacy theory’ (Mudde 
2007: 116), and argues that the gendered nature of support for the PRR may 
have less to do with the ideas of the parties in question and more to do with the 
image of the parties as radical or even extreme parties. Because women often 
have lower levels of political efficacy and lower levels of political interest, they 
are more likely to vote for ‘established parties’ (Mudde 2007: 115–16). In other 
words, women may disagree less with the message and more with the image 
of the parties in question. Mudde thus identifies the genderedness of political 
socialisation but does not fully develop this argument with regard to populist 
attitudes, given his focus on radical parties. Our focus is on populist parties 
and not on the radical or even the extreme nature of the parties per se.
In sum, given the above insights, there is reason to assume that there may 
also be something about the thin-centred ideology of populism (again, its qual-
ities), such as its people-centredness or perhaps its antagonistic (Manichean) 
qualities, that is less attractive for women voters. Consequently, women might 
vote less for populist parties than men even though they may agree with the 
programmatic views of the parties.
For the PRR, the gender gap in voting has been robustly demonstrated. Our 
explanation, however, is initially not conditional on the populist radical right: 
Populism could well be expected to unify both the left and the right on this 
front. The foregoing raises the question of whether there is a gender gap among 
the populist radical left. One of the first large voter studies of the attitudes of 
those with a left-wing ideology (Visser et al. 2014) does not show such a gap. In 
fact, it might also be counterintuitive to assume a gender gap on the left, given 
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that it has been shown that women vote more for the left for socio-economic 
and ideological (attitude) reasons. Thus, given that the radical left is more 
inclined to support redistribution and income equality (e.g. Bowyer and Vail 
2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003; March and Rommerskirchen 2015), we may 
even expect more women to support radical left parties. In other words, if our 
notion of gendered populist attitudes holds, the gender dynamics in voting for 
the populist radical left would counter the normal trend for women to be more 
supportive of left-wing parties. To test the general validity of our argument, 
both the populist radical right and left will be studied.
Returning to the core of our argument, we focus on the idea that popu-
list attitudes translate into ‘populist behaviour’: voting for populist parties. As 
argued above, these parties, either on the left or the right, are not only populist 
but also connect populism with other ideologies. In other words, there are 
many reasons why voters might support populist parties. However, only by 
including attitudes that tap into these different components of the ideologies 
can we examine which factors are most important. From this perspective, and 
focusing on the PRR, the distinction between populist attitudes and anti-immi-
gration attitudes might also shed new light on the linkage between the socio- 
economic positions of men and women and voting for the PRR. The structural 
socio-economic argument claims that women are less likely to be employed 
in labour-intensive jobs, such as factory jobs and jobs that are challenged by 
immigrants ‒ i.e. workers who are willing to receive less pay (see Harteveld et al. 
2015; Immerzeel et al. 2015; Ivarsflaten 2005, 2008). Here it might not just be 
the economic structure and the perceived threat from labour immigration that 
lead to the higher likelihood among men to vote for the PRR but also the idea 
that politicians have sold them – the low-skilled workers – out, which feeds 
into a populist mind-set: perceiving society to be divided between the good 
people and the misrepresenting political elite.
In sum, we expect that populist attitudes partly explain the gender gap 
(ceteris paribus) in voting for populist parties. However, the effect might be 
partly mediated by the relationship among gender, socio-economic position, 
and voting populist, in particular on the right side of the political spectrum.
Methods and data
Survey and case selection
We use the European Elections Surveys (EES) 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2015) as 
our data source. These data are the only cross-national data that include voting 
behaviour as well as items related to our core explanatory concepts, including 
indicators that are needed to construct indexes on populism and attitudes regard-
ing anti-immigration, law and order, and economic policies. The sample size 
and elections surveyed ensure that we have a sufficient number of respondents 
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who indicate having voted for the populist radical right or populist radical left. 
We focus on West and South European countries and, of those, we include all 
countries present in the EES data that have a populist party, based on the crite-
rion that at least 5% of the respondents who voted indicated that they voted for 
that party during the last national elections.3 This approach makes it possible to 
include multiple countries while also having group sizes that potentially allow 
for disaggregating the analyses by country, at least for some countries. Thus, for 
instance, Belgium and Sweden have not been included because only approx-
imately 3% to 4% of the (voting) respondents indicated Flemish Interest and 
the Sweden Democrats as their party of choice. If a country had both a populist 
radical right and a populist radical left party, we included the country in both 
analyses if for at least one of these choices the 5% threshold was met. These 
criteria resulted in the inclusion of eight countries: seven with a PRR party and 
five with a PRL party. In three countries, both were present (Table 1). The classi-
fication of parties as populist follows Van Kessel (2015), with three exceptions. 
Based on other studies, we also include the Dutch Socialist Party (Akkerman 
et al. 2014; Lucardie and Voerman 2012; Otjes and Louwerse 2015), Podemos 
(Gómez-Reino and Iván Llamazares 2015) and Golden Dawn (Ellinas 2013).4
Dependent variable and models
The EES includes three different vote choice variables that allow us to construct 
a robust indicator of ‘voting populist’ (which is at the core of this study) and 
to test the mediating impact of populist attitudes on the relationship between 
Table 1. parties’ classification.
notes: all other parties present in the data were considered not populist. party classification is based on 
Van Kessel (2015) with the exception of three parties. these are included according to the following 
studies: the Dutch socialist party (lucardie and Voerman 2012; akkerman et al. 2014; otjes and louw-
erse 2015), Podemos (Gómez-reino and iván llamazares 2015), and Golden Dawn (ellinas 2013). Golden 
Dawn is a borderline case, it is clearly right-wing and anti-migration, but not per se populist. We have 
rerun several analyses removing Golden Dawn voters from the sample, which gave similar results. see 
note 5 regarding the classification of the Five star Movement.
1Podemos was only included in two of the sampled dependent variables: the last european elections and 
‘what would you vote today’, and not for the last national elections because their rise took place after-
wards.
populist radical right populist radical left
austria austrian Freedom party
alliance for the Future of austria
‒
Denmark Danish people’s party ‒
Finland true Finns ‒
France national Front ‒
Germany ‒ the left
Greece popular orthodox rally
Golden Dawn
coalition of the radical left
italy northern league Five star Movement
netherlands party for Freedom socialist party
spain ‒ We can1
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gender and voting populist. Thus, by combining the different party-choice var-
iables, we can create an interval variable and conduct an ordinary least-squares 
regression (OLS). This approach is crucial for the comparison of coefficients 
across models. Regular vote models often use logistic regressions but, as Mood 
(2010) clearly argues – unfortunately, only recently has this insight become 
more widespread – the transformation of the dependent variable in logistic 
regressions has the effect that the coefficients cannot simply be compared across 
models. In other words, testing mediating effects using logistic regression mod-
els is problematic, as it requires the inclusion of an additional variable. This 
approach can lead to a change in the coefficient of the other variables for tech-
nical rather than substantive reasons. In other words, a change in the coefficient 
cannot be ascribed with certainty to the mediating effect. We therefore revert 
to OLS models. The downside of using OLS models, however, is that the stand-
alone coefficients must be interpreted carefully given the dependent variable’s 
scale; for comparing the coefficients across models, this issue is not a problem.
Still, one could make the argument that logistic models do provide some 
insight into changing coefficients: if large decreases are found, it is highly 
unlikely that they are a result of including only one additional variable, as is 
the case here. Acknowledging that there is a trade-off between the different 
particularities of the models, we perform and report the results of multiple 
robustness tests, including running the logistic models for the different 0–1 
vote variables. Another possible alternative is the use of propensity-to-vote 
scores, but this approach is not satisfactory for two reasons. First, propen-
sity scores for populist radical right parties are highly skewed towards the 
extremes, which does not improve on OLS regression models.5 Second, there 
is a gendered problem regarding concept measurement and discrepancy: the 
gender gap in propensity to vote shows a different dynamic than the gender 
gap in actual party choice. In other words, the difference between propensity 
scores and party choice is gendered, which makes it an unreliable proxy for 
understanding voting behaviour (see Spierings and Zaslove 2015a, 2015b). In 
one of the robustness tests, however, we did include the propensity score as an 
additional item in our dependent variable. In summary, we report the results 
of multiple robustness tests to determine whether they confirm or disconfirm 
the core results.
The multi-item indicator that we use for our main OLS party choice models 
is based on the respondents’ vote choice in the last general election; their vote 
choice if the general elections were held today; and their vote choice in the 
last elections for the European Parliament. Combining these, we can include 
those who never intended to vote for a PRR or PRL party, those who voted for 
a PRR or PRL party, those who have only voted once or twice, and those who 
do so consistently. Creating a multi-item indicator in this manner also makes 
the results less sensitive to the particularities of each of these variables or elec-
tions, thus increasing the reliability of measuring who votes for populists and 
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who does not. That the three vote items can be combined and tap into the same 
underlying political behaviour is confirmed empirically: the three dichotomous 
indicators for voting PRR correlate between 0.70 and 0.85; a factor analysis 
shows that the three items load on a single factor;6 and Cronbach’s alpha is 
very high (0.92).
Based on the conceptual literature (see above), we classify parties into three 
categories: populist radical left parties, populist radical right parties, and not 
populist parties (NP) (see Table 1). Respondents who indicated that they did not 
vote or did not want to answer the question were not included in the analysis. 
The survey answers included all major and minor parties; those who said ‘other 
party’ nevertheless were considered to have voted for a non-populist party.7 In 
the present analysis, we study voting for the populist radical right and voting 
for the populist radical left separately. The dependent variables indicate the 
number of times that respondents indicate that they have voted or would vote 
for the PRR/PRL versus NP. This scale runs from 0 to 3 for the PRR. For the 
PRL, it runs from 0 to 2 because in Spain only two dependent variables were 
available: Podemos did not run in the first national election. We coded those 
voting for the PRL in all elections as ‘2’, those who never did so as ‘0’, and those 
who did so at least once but not always as ‘1’. To control for different levels of 
support for populist parties between countries, fixed-effects models are used.
Independent variables
To measure the so-called ‘gender gap’ or differences between the average among 
women and the average among men, we use self-reported sex. In the regres-
sion analysis, men are the reference category. A negative coefficient gives the 
extent to which women have lower chances of voting for a populist party. If 
populist attitudes partly explain the gender gap, the negative coefficient should 
decrease after the inclusion of the populist attitudes variable. The latter is based 
on six items, which were selected based on the theoretical concept of populism 
(Akkerman et al. 2014; Mudde 2004) and a factor analysis (see Appendix A1). 
In the factor analysis, we included a multitude of related items that are not 
per se related to populism, including political attitudes focusing on internal 
political efficacy, political interest, closeness to a political party, political trust, 
and the idea that politics and people constitute opposites. The latter two tap 
into the theoretical concept of a thin-centred populist ideology (Akkerman 
et al. 2014; Mudde 2004; Spierings et al. 2015), and indeed the six items8 that 
relate to ‘trust’ and ‘political opposites’ all load on one and the same factor 
(factor loadings  >  0.670). The fact that the other items do not load on the 
same factor indicates that these six items measure populist attitudes – attitudes 
that focus on the tension between politicians and political institutions on the 
one hand and ordinary citizens on the other hand. It also indicates that this 
concept is distinct from other political attitudes. As such, our empirical factor 
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analysis confirms that there is a cluster of items that load on one factor, and, 
conceptually, these are the items that relate to the core notion of populism as 
a Manichean ideology distinguishing the good people from the evil political 
elite.9 Each of the six items has four answer categories, and these are recoded so 
that a higher score indicates higher populist attitudes. These scores are summed 
and rescaled to a 0–10 scale.
In the literature, other variables have been used to explain the gender gap 
in PRR voting, and these variables are also included. The most important ide-
ological variables are anti-immigration, law and order, and anti-EU attitudes 
(Immerzeel 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015b). Given that this study is the 
first, to our knowledge, that examines PRL parties and gender, we also include 
economic attitudes – the classic left–right divide. Anti-immigration attitudes 
are measured on a scale from 0 (fully opposed to a restrictive policy) to 10 
(fully in favour of a restrictive policy). Taking a strong law and order stance is 
measured on a similar scale: 0 (fully support privacy rights even if they hinder 
combating crime) to 10 (fully in favour of restricting privacy rights in order to 
combat crime). The EES included multiple items measuring attitudes towards 
the EU. The three that were theoretically closest to general attitudes towards 
EU integration and the EU loaded on a single factor.10 Each of the three items 
was rescaled to a variable from 0 to 10, with a higher score indicating more 
anti-EU attitudes, and the average score of these three was used in the analysis. 
The last ideological attitude measured was an economic left–right scale. Two 
specific items measure the economic dimension well and have better response 
rates than a general left–right item: ‘Are you in favour of or opposed to the 
redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in your country?’ and ‘Are 
you in favour of or opposed to state intervention in the economy?’ These two 
items load on a single factor, and we calculated the average score from 0 to 10, 
where 0 is economically extreme left-wing and 10 extremely right-wing.
In addition, we include occupational status as an explanation for voting 
for the PRR. This variable is also an indicator that is generally used to assess 
whether the gender gap in voting for the PRR can be explained by structural 
socio-economic differences between men and women. Including this variable 
also allows us to examine whether populist attitudes are part of the mechanism 
that links socio-economic position to the gender gap. If the effect found for 
employment decreases after the inclusion of populist attitudes, then it does 
(see Harteveld et al. 2015; Immerzeel 2015; Ivarsflaten 2008). We distinguish 
among owners of small businesses, manual labourers, and the unemployed, 
given that research demonstrates that these groups are prone to vote for the 
radical right (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2008). We also include the non-employed sep-
arately; this category includes pensioners, those who are unfit for work, and 
stay-at-home parents. The reference category is ‘other employed’, which refers 
to those employed in white-collar jobs. In addition, we control for generational 
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and age effects by including age. Those aged 18 and over were included; the age 
of 18 is used as the origin.
The purpose is to make valid comparisons across the models. As a result, 
all models are estimated on the sample of respondents with valid scores on all 
variables, including the most complete model. In this manner, we can ensure 
that changes between the models are not due to differences in sample size and 
the inclusion of different respondents.
Results
Are women less populist?
Before addressing the gender gap in voting for the PRR and PRL, we establish 
whether and to what extent a face-value gender gap in fact exists. Figure 1 
provides the (weighted) percentage of votes for the party families for women. 
Comparing the PRR parties to the non-populist parties demonstrates a clear 
difference, which is the case for each of the vote choice variables: populist 
radical right parties draw relatively more votes from men than do non- 
populist parties. The difference is between 7 and 9 percentage points, and if we 
disaggregate the data by country, this pattern is found in 16 of the 21 cases. In 
the three Italian cases, the opposite is found; however, the subsample of Italian 
PRR voters is the smallest of all countries, making this result less reliable. The 
two other exceptions are found for one of the three Dutch party choice varia-
bles and one of the three Austrian variables. In both cases, no clear difference 
between men and women (either positive or negative) was found. Overall, the 
picture is quite clear: on average, PRR parties draw more votes from men than 
other parties. At the same time, as has been argued previously (Spierings and 
Figure 1. Gender differences in prr and prl voting behaviour.
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Zaslove 2015b), we should not exaggerate this gap, as all bars in Figure 1 are 
between 43% and 51%.
Are women also less attracted to populist radical left parties? Figure 1 shows 
that the distribution of women and men among PRL parties is more skewed 
towards men than for the non-populist parties, with a gap of 2 to 4 percentage 
points. This difference is thus considerably smaller than is found for the PRR 
parties; the PRL sits consistently between the PRR and non-populist parties. 
Again, disaggregating this result by country demonstrates that the pattern is 
repeated for 10 out of 14 cases.11
As noted, these results are not controlled for explanations for voting for 
the PRR and PRL. For example, women are on average somewhat less anti- 
immigrant in our sample (see Table 2; see Harteveld et al. 2015), which might imply 
that the gender gap for voting for the PRR is somewhat larger than indicated. 
Similarly, since the 1990s, women have become relatively more left-wing eco-
nomically (2003) – as is also the case in our sample (see Table 2) – thus, the 
net gap of voting for the PRL between women and men might be larger than 
suggested by the figures presented above. Therefore, we need to control for 
these factors in order to establish the net gender gap in voting for the PRR 
(and PRL) and subsequently to analyse to what extent populist attitudes might 
explain the residual gap.
In this respect, it is noteworthy that Table 2 shows that the average populist 
attitudes among men and women differ only slightly.12 A closer look at the 
distribution shows that the difference between women and men is also found 
for higher populist attitudes (scores of 8 to 10), but the difference remains 
small. The within-group variation among women and men is much greater 
than the between-group variation. However, the degree of populism can also 
be expected to be related to the other explanatory variables. Only by assess-
ing the variables together and including them simultaneously in a multiple 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on explanatory variables for men and women separately.
note: Descriptives are based on cases that had valid scores on all variables, including the votes variables; n 
= 3360 (1683 women and 1519 men); weighted (w1).
source: ees 2014.
Mean men s.d. men Mean women s.d. women
populist attitudes (0–10) 4.21 2.29 4.13 2.20
strongly populist (proportion 8–10) 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.24
economic left‒right position (0–10) 4.43 2.14 4.34 1.96
anti-migration attitudes (0–10) 5.65 2.92 5.52 2.86
law and order attitudes (0–10) 5.00 2.84 5.38 2.72
anti-eu attitudes (0–10) 4.67 2.36 4.75 2.16
occupational status
Not employed: unemployed 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23
Not employed: other 0.31 0.46 0.42 0.49
Employed: manual labour 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.16
Self-employed: small business 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
Employed: other 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.50
age (18 = 0) 32.7 15.9 33.7 16.2
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regression model can we account for this difference, and only in this manner 
can we assess whether the degree of populism might explain the gender gap 
in voting for the PRR or PRL parties. An OLS model with populist attitudes 
as the dependent variable and the other variables from Table 2 as independent 
variables (and country dummies) demonstrates that women are slightly less 
populist on average (ceteris paribus): 0.076 less populist. This gap is relatively 
small, but with a certainty of 95% we can expect that in the population at large, 
women are indeed less populist.
The gender gap in voting for the populist radical right
In Table 3, we present the multivariate analysis. Before turning to the mediat-
ing influence of populist attitudes, we need to establish the overall validity of 
the model and the extent to which a gender gap exists, as these two elements 
are fundamental to the further analysis. Because the control variables act in 
accordance with the literature, it is safe to assume that our data and model are 
generally valid.
Regarding the gender gap in voting for the PRR compared to voting for 
non-populist parties, Model 1 shows that a statistically significant (p < 0.001) 
gender gap exists in voting for the PRR, but it should not be overestimated, 
as it is 0.15 on a three-point scale. Moreover, Model 2 shows that the regu-
lar explanatory variables explain 19% of this gap, but it remains substantively 
and statistically significant. In other words, after taking into account that, for 
instance, women’s and men’s averages differ with regard to anti-immigration 
attitudes and socio-economic positions, women are (still) less likely to vote for 
the PRR compared to men. This result justifies a further analysis of the gender 
gap by adding our new explanation of populist attitudes to the model (Model 
3) to test whether it can explain part of the remaining gap.
In Model 3, we do indeed find a positive effect of holding more populist 
attitudes on voting for the PRR. Together with the findings above, there is a 
small gender gap in holding populist attitudes (ceteris paribus). This result 
suggests a link between sex and populist attitudes and voting behaviour, and 
indeed, we find that when comparing the coefficient of the dummy variable 
for respondents’ sex in Models 2 and 3, it decreases. This decrease is a modest 
9%. Considering, however, that we only included one additional variable and 
that the modest explanatory power we find here is equal to or slightly stronger 
than the effect found in other studies attempting to explain the gender gap in 
voting for the PRR (e.g. Harteveld et al. 2015; Immerzeel et al. 2015; Spierings 
and Zaslove 2015b), the result should not be ignored. Examining the control 
variables, we also see that most of the other variables – anti-EU attitudes being 
the exception – are not affected considerably by including populist attitudes, 
which is another indication that we are not tapping into another concept or pre-
senting a spurious relationship. In light of these findings, it should also be noted 
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that the variables measuring socio-economic position, such as unemployment 
or holding a manual labour position, are only very modestly influenced by the 
inclusion of populist attitudes. This result suggests that populist attitudes do 
not mediate the linkage between socio-economic position and voting for the 
PRR and thus that the structural socio-economic gender gap explanation (e.g. 
Harteveld et al. 2015) is separate from the one we present here.
Robustness
To validate whether the mediating role of populist attitudes is robust, we have 
run several variations on the models presented above, adjusting both the pop-
ulist attitudes and party choice variables. Appendix B2 provides a full overview 
of the extent to which the coefficient for the gender dummy decreases.
Varying the indicators used in the populist attitudes variable or changing it to 
a dummy (strongly populist vs. not strongly populist) does show similar results 
(a 7‒9% decrease). Next, we estimated party-choice models per election type 
using logistic regression models and a multinomial model using the dependent 
variable: voted for the PRR at least once (versus never having voted for a popu-
list party or having voted for the PRL at least once). As noted, the results of these 
models should be interpreted carefully, as the changes in coefficients are mod-
est, and the fact that the models are estimated using logistic regression impacts 
on the changes in the coefficients for technical reasons as well. Nevertheless, all 
these models still show a decrease in the gender gap indicator after the inclusion 
of populist attitudes, although the decrease is somewhat smaller than in the 
main OLS models. This result is likely to be (partly) caused by the choice of 
model. Finally, we varied the indicators included in the party-choice variable 
by only examining national elections (not the European elections) and also 
by adding propensity to vote for the PRR as an additional item. Both of these 
models show effects similar to the models presented in Table 2.
In sum, for the overall pooled model, the general direction of our findings 
is very robust with regard to changes in the core explanatory variables, the 
dependent variables and the estimation technique. The substantive size of the 
gender gap explained by populist attitudes varies across the models. Based on 
the results from the different models, the decrease seems to be between 5% and 
10%, which, as noted, is a modest increase, but it is similar to what has been 
found for other explanations of the gender gap in the literature.
Country-specific models
For four countries, the subsample sizes (>40 PRR voters) also allow us to repeat 
the analysis on the disaggregated sample by country. This approach allows 
us to examine whether the results might be context- and party-specific. The 
countries are Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Greece. The core coefficients of 
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these analyses are provided in Table 4. These results confirm the overall picture: 
women vote for the PRR slightly less often, and this disparity is partly explained 
by a difference in populist attitudes: in all cases, the gender gap coefficient 
decreases after including the populism variable as a mediating factor. It should 
be noted that both the gender gap and the mediating role of populist attitudes 
vary considerably across countries. Denmark and Greece stand out as countries 
where populism explains a considerable degree of the gender gap.
To the extent that the sample sizes permitted, we reran all the robustness 
variations for these countries separately (Appendix B2). The analyses largely 
confirm our general conclusion with regard to the PRR gender gap being 
partly explained by populist attitudes, but they show some variations as well. 
Whereas Greece shows the strongest decreases (up to 41%), the models for 
Austria include a considerable increase in the gender gap after the inclusion of 
populist attitudes. Moreover, the logistic regression models show more changes 
hovering around the 0% mark. Due to the technicalities involved with logistic 
models, it is safer to only focus on the changes in the dummy coefficient that 
are, for instance, at least 4%. Taking this criterion into account, 21 of the 22 
country-specific models confirm a decreasing gender gap after controlling for 
populist attitudes.
In sum, we find a robust pattern of a modest sex gap in voting for the PRR. 
This pattern decreases after taking into account populist attitudes among 
women and men. It seems that the populism in PRR parties does attract men 
somewhat more than women. Or, phrased differently, populism seems to deter 
women slightly more than men from voting for PRR parties. The country vari-
ation within the overall pattern should be further examined in future research. 
For example, in Austria, a similar gender gap is found as in Greece (see Table 4), 
Table 4. the impact of populism on the gender gap per country.
notes: only de B coefficients are given here; the underlying models are the same as models 2, 3, 5 and 6 in 
table 2, but then estimated per country.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.10; n.a. indicates there was no considerable prr or prl in that country, or in the cases of 
France, italy, and the netherlands that they did not meet the criteria of number of prr voters to allow 
separate estimates (>40).
Populist radical right Populist radical left
Before 
entering 
populism
After 
inclusion 
populism Difference
Before 
entering 
populism
After 
inclusion 
populism Difference
austria −0.180** −0.170 −6% n.a. n.a.
Denmark −0.029 −0.022 −24% n.a. n.a.
Finland −0.216* −0.205 −5% n.a. n.a.
France n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Germany n.a. n.a. −0.131* −0.109 −17%
Greece −0.176 −0.129 −27% 0.127 0.112 −12%
italy n.a. n.a. 0.070 0.063 −10%
netherlands n.a. n.a. −0.118* −0.116* −2%
spain n.a. n.a. −0.114 −0.086 −25%
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but populism is less of a mediating factor, which might relate to a somewhat 
different degree of masculinity in the style and rhetoric of the parties.
The gender gap in voting for the populist radical left
The question is, are the above results due to how populism manifests itself 
in combination with the attaching ideology – the radical right (e.g. anti- 
immigration positions) – or does it only have something to do with the thin- 
centred ideology of populism? In order to further investigate this  question, we 
turn to the populist radical left.
Table 3 includes results from models similar to those we used for the PRR 
parties, but in this case explaining PRL voting based on the data for Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. In general, it appears that economic 
attitudes are much more important for voting for the PRL than for the PRR, 
but both party types attract more voters with strong anti-EU attitudes than 
non-populist parties. Similarly to the case of the PRR, the overall models seem 
to fit the results found in the literature, thus confirming their validity.
Regarding gender and populism, first of all, Models 4‒6 to some extent con-
firm what we observed in Figure 1: there is a gender gap for PRL voting, but it is 
considerably smaller than it was for the PRR. In fact, the gap is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. A closer look at Table 4 demonstrates that 
the gender gap for the PRL is also more varied across countries. The largest 
negative gender gaps are found for Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. For 
the German sample, approximately one-sixth of the gender gap appears to 
be explained by gender differences in holding populist attitudes; for Spain, 
this value is actually 25%, but the original gap is not statistically significant. 
For the Netherlands, only a very mediating effect is found. For the other two 
countries, no mediating effect is found that explains why women vote less for 
populist parties because no such gender gap was found in the model without 
the populist attitudes to start with.
Similar robustness tests as for voting for the PRR were conducted (Appendix 2). 
Given the mixed results over the countries, the pooled model’s results cannot 
be given much weight: the decrease in the gender gap after including populist 
attitudes might seem to be substantial, but this result must be viewed relative 
to the hardly existing gap to start with, which distorts the picture. The coun-
try-specific models for the three countries that registered a negative gender 
gap in Table 4 further show rather unstable results for the Dutch case, which 
might be related to the presence of a PRR party as well ‒ i.e. multiple populist 
options were offered to voters. For the German Die Linke and the Spanish 
Podemos, the role of populist attitudes seems to be rather robust and in line 
with the expectations.
This comparative analysis is one of the first assessments of voting for the 
PRL and shows that gender and political attitudes do play a role in such voting 
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  839
preferences. For two countries, the pattern found for the PRL seems to be con-
firmed, but for the three others, it is not. These latter three are the countries 
where a strong PRR party is also present. This complex relationship deserves 
more attention in further research.
Conclusion
A recurring question within the field of populism is, why do more men than 
women vote for populist parties? As noted, research over the last few decades 
implies that we know more about the reasons that voters support populist par-
ties, in particular populist radical right parties (e.g. Betz 1994; Immerzeel 2015; 
Ivarsflaten 2008; Lubbers et al. 2002; Norris 2005). We also know more about 
why more men vote for populist radical right parties than do women. However, 
also as noted, we are still not able to fully explain the gender gap (Harteveld 
et al. 2015; Immerzeel et al. 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015b). Spierings and 
Zaslove (2015b) conclude that perhaps the best manner in which to under-
stand the gender gap is to consider PRR parties as a more radical version of 
the mainstream right. If so, we should also take the populist left into account.
In this study, we thus examine whether it was populism rather than right-
wing (or left-wing) ideology that explains the so-called gender gap. In the first 
step of our analysis, we assessed whether women do indeed vote less for populist 
parties, and whether this tendency indeed holds for both the populist radical 
right and the populist radical left. It does seem to hold for both the PRR and 
PRL that men tend to vote more for them, although the tendency is consid-
erably stronger and more consistent for the radical right than for the radical 
left. However, even for the PRR, we should be careful in labelling these parties 
as Männerparteien. These parties draw a large minority of their votes from 
women even though they are relatively traditional regarding gender issues (see 
Akkerman 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015a). In other words, these parties 
represent women’s concerns, albeit gender-traditional and anti-feminist posi-
tions (see Celis and Childs 2012).
Next, our analysis showed that for the PRR parties, the populism variables 
do indeed partly explain why more men vote for the PRR than do women. In 
the case of the radical left, this pattern is only found in two cases. In these two 
cases, no PRR party was present, while in the other three cases, a PRR party was 
present. In other words, it is possible that the gender gap in voting for the PRR 
and to a lesser extent the PRL in part occurs because populism turns women 
away from voting for populist radical right parties. Until now, the structural 
socio-economic approach has been the main explanation for the gender gap 
in voting for the PRR. The mediating impact of populist attitudes on voting 
behaviour employed in this study adds to the existing explanations of the gen-
der gap in voting for populists, and in particular the populist radical right. In 
other words, the relationship demonstrated in this study provides an additional 
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explanation for the gender gap that is not accounted for by the existing explana-
tions. Thus, for example, populist attitudes do not mediate the socio-economic 
factors but constitute an independent and alternative explanation for part of the 
gender gap. In fact, we only found one other clear mediation effect of populist 
attitudes for both the PRL and the PRR. Populist attitudes were connected with 
opposition to European integration, suggesting that opposition to European 
integration may be about the divide between the ‘evil political elite’ and the 
‘good people’ and not so much about the EU itself. From a gender perspective, 
this finding might be particularly relevant, as the EU has been a driving force 
for women’s emancipation and the emancipation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) people across Europe.
That populism does not play the same role in attracting or repelling women 
and men from the PRL suggests that the thin-centred populist ideology works 
differently for the left than for the right. It would be interesting to compare 
our results with supply-side analyses within the context of party systems that 
have different combinations of left- and right-wing populist parties. In other 
words, in systems where there are several populist parties, and in particular 
populist radical right and populist radical left parties, the question is whether 
this presence of both party types affects whether women vote for (certain) 
populist parties.
Our results for the PRR and the PRL in the cases of Germany and Spain were 
robust across countries and estimation methods: they all point towards pop-
ulism as possessing a modest mediating impact on women voting less for the 
populist radical left. At the same time, the gender gap differs considerably across 
countries, as we found before using the ESS instead of EES data (Spierings and 
Zaslove 2015b), and the mediating role of populism also varied considerably. 
The particular country, election or party seems to play a major role in shaping 
to what extent and why women vote less for PRR parties. Further analyses that 
also take into account the ideological programmes and leadership of these 
parties might explain these differences. This context dependency deserves to 
be theorised and studied in more detail by bringing together the demand and 
supply literature in a systematic way (see Rydgren 2007; Spierings and Zaslove 
2015a). In this article, we hope to have made a first step in theorising and pre-
senting how populist attitudes as a gendered concept help to further explain 
who votes for the PRR and who does not.
Notes
1.  It is more difficult to classify Movimento 5 Stelle. Early on in its political 
development, it was more clearly a left-wing party (both regarding demand 
and supply). More recently, it has received support from voters from both the 
left and the right, while its political message has even on occasion included 
more right-wing issues (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013, 2015; Natale 2014).
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2.  For a similar discussion regarding this section please see Spierings and Zaslove 
(2015b).
3.  Spain is the exception here because Podemos did not participate in this national 
election but, based on the party’s other election results, we consider it to be 
currently a major populist party in Europe, so we included Spain.
4.  Considering the Golden Dawn as a PRR party is debatable, as it is clearly anti-
immigration and right-wing but not unambiguously populist. There is no 
ideal solution here because the party is likely a communicating vessel with the 
Populist Orthodox Rally (POR), and placing it in the non-populist group or 
removing it from the sample would distort the analysis. Moreover, not including 
it would remove a considerable number of voters. We carried out a robustness 
check by rerunning some models with only the POR. The results still showed 
a decrease in the coefficient found for the female dummy after the inclusion 
of populist attitudes.
 As noted above, the classification of the Movimento 5 Stelle is also somewhat 
problematic. There is consensus that it is a populist party, however, as noted, 
it also attracts voters from the centre-right, while some statements, especially 
regarding immigration, make classification more difficult. However, classifying 
it as populist radical right party would be incorrect. Thus, for substantive and 
methodological reasons (i.e. similar to issues mentioned above with Golden 
Dawn) we have chosen to classify it as a populist radical left party.
5.  In the EES data on the countries included here, almost two-thirds of all voters 
score either 1 or 11 on a propensity scale that ranges from 1 to 11.
6.  Principal Axis Factoring; Eigenvalue: 2.60; KMO 0.74; Bartlett’s Test (p < 0.001); 
factor loadings all above 0.84.
7.  Only a handful of people are included here; excluding them does not influence 
the conclusions.
8.  These items are the following: ‘You trust the national parliament’; ‘The national 
parliament takes the concerns of citizens into consideration’; ‘My voice counts 
in the EU’; ‘My voice counts in my country’; ‘You trust the institutions of the 
EU’; and ‘The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of 
European citizens’.
9.  It should be noted that these items are not the same ones as used by other studies 
of populist attitudes (Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2012; Spruyt et al. 
2016). The items from the other studies are relatively new and have not been 
included in larger comparative surveys, as yet.
10.  These items include the following: ‘Whether the EU is generally a good thing 
or not’; ‘Whether European integration has gone too far or not’; and ‘Whether 
the EU or member states should have the most authority over citizens’.
11.  Disaggregating the non-populist parties and focusing only on the main left-wing 
parties shows that the gender balance is generally more in favour of women 
among the mainstream left-wing parties. Differences in the gender balance in 
voting in favour of women are found in 10 of 14 cases for the mainstream left-
wing party compared to the PRL party. The major exception is Greece, which 
shows a different pattern throughout, as does the Dutch case for the European 
elections.
12.  If we do not focus on the overall scale but on the six indicators separately, we 
find no strong differences. The differences between men and women are not 
above 0.1 on scales ranging from 1 to 4.
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KMO and Bartlett’s test
Kaiser‒Meyer‒olkin Measure of sampling adequacy 0.797
Bartlett’s test of sphericity approx. chi-square 11992.403
df 78
sig. 0.000
Structure matrix
Factor
1 2
qpp9_1 You trust the (nationalitY parliaMent) / Qpp9 For each of the fol-
lowing statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your 
attitude or opinion.
0.776
qpp9_2 the (nationalitY parliaMent) takes the concerns of (nationalitY) 
citizens into consideration / Qpp9 For each of the following statements, please 
tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion.
0.785
qpp9_3 sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person 
like you can’t really understand what’s going on / Qpp9 For each of the fol-
lowing statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your 
attitude or opinion.
qpp21 dichotomised: Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular 
political party? [yes/no]
d71_1 national political matters / D71 When you get together with friends or 
relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about...?
0.800
d71_2 european political matters / D71 When you get together with friends or 
relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about...?
0.785
d71_3 local political matters / D71 When you get together with friends or rela-
tives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about...?
0.596
d72_1 My voice counts in the eu / D72 please tell me to what extent you agree or 
disagree with each of the following statements.
0.751
d72_2 My voice counts in (our countrY) / D72 please tell me to what extent 
you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.
0.732
qp6_2 You trust the institutions of the eu / Qp6 For each of the following state-
ments, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or 
opinion.
0.645
qp6_9 You are very interested in politics / Qp6 For each of the following state-
ments, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or 
opinion.
0.506
qp6_4 the european parliament takes into consideration the concerns of europe-
an citizens / Qp6 For each of the following statements, please tell me to what 
extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion.
0.720
qp6_7 it is very important for you which particular candidates have been elected 
as Meps in the european parliament / Qp6 For each of the following statements, 
please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion.
extraction Method: principal axis Factoring. rotation Method: oblimin with Kaiser normalisation.
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